Mirror-touch synaesthesia (MTS) is a condition that leads people to experience tactile sensations on their own body when watching at someone else being touched. Recent accounts postulate that MTS is linked with atypical self-other representations. It has been suggested that this may be associated with disturbances in two main components of self-awareness: sense of agency and sense of ownership. This study investigates changes in sense of agency and sense of ownership in MTS. Using a paradigm that deliberately blurs the boundaries between the self and the other, we not only found that MTS affects sense of agency and sense of ownership, but that these aspects of self-awareness are affected differently. We suggest that alterations in sense of agency can be linked to more profound disturbances in sense of ownership in MTS, and that MTS may be characterised by underlying difficulties in self-other processing.
Introduction
Recent findings have shown a near universal tendency for us to vicariously represent the actions and sensations of others. For example, similar neural networks are recruited when we experience touch directly on ourselves or when we observe another person being touched (e.g. see Keysers, Kaas, & Gazzola, 2010 for a review) . This vicarious activation is normally implicit, in that it does not lead to an explicit sensation of the observed event on the body of the observer, however, in mirror-touch synaesthesia (MTS) the vicarious experience of touch is overt (Banissy, 2013; Ward & Banissy, 2015) . In MTS individuals feel a tactile sensation on their own body simply by observing touch being applied to someone else (Blakemore, Bristow, Bird, Frith, & Ward, 2005) . This experience is thought to occur in approximately 1.6% of individuals (Banissy, Kadosh, Maus, Walsh, & Ward, 2009) and there is growing interest in using MTS as a vehicle to provide insights on mechanisms of social perception and cognition. For example, prior has examined facial affect processing in MTS in order to examine theoretical accounts on the role of simulation processes in affect recognition (Banissy, Kusnir, Duchaine, Walsh, & Ward, 2011) .
Prior neuroimaging studies suggest that MTS is linked to overactivity within neural regions supporting normal mirroring of touch. In people with MTS, observation of touch recruits a similar network of areas to those activated in non synaesthetes, but compared to them, they show a hyper-activation (Blakemore et al., 2005; Holle, Banissy, & Ward, 2013) . Recently, it has been suggested that a breakdown in self-other processing may contribute to this over-active tactile mirroring in MTS. More specifically, mechanisms responsible for controlling self-other representations may be impaired in MTS, and this would lead to a difficulty in inhibiting the experiences of others (Banissy & Ward, 2013; Ward & Banissy, 2015) .
In line with this, prior behavioural work has shown that bodily self-awareness is altered in MTS (Aimola Davies & White, 2013; Maister, Banissy, & Tsakiris, 2013) . Here, we sought to build on these findings by investigating the effects of MTS on the two main aspects of self-awareness: the sense of ownership (SO) and the sense of agency (SA). SO refers to the feeling that one's body is one's own, whereas SA refers to the feeling that one's actions are one's own. As noted above, prior work from Aimola Davies et al. and Master et al. have suggested that SO is atypical in MTS, but nothing is known about changes in SA in MTS. There are good reasons to predict SA changes in MTS (see Cioffi, Moore, & Banissy, 2014 , for a review). First, theoretical accounts of agency processing argue that the positive experience of agency is predicated on feeling that the body part that is moving is one's own (Gallagher, 2000) . Second, two brain regions associated with SA, namely the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and the anterior insula (Decety & Lamm, 2007; Farrer & Frith, 2002) , have also been implicated in MTS (Blakemore et al., 2005; Holle et al., 2013) . By extending the investigation of self-awareness to include SA, our aim was to http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.10.020 0010-0277/Ó 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
